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UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS AT LITTLE ROCK
LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME 6 1983 NUMBER 2
IN DEFENSE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
EXCLUSIONARY RULE-A REPLY TO ATTORNEY
GENERAL SMITH
John Wesley Hall, Jr. *
The Reagan Administration has mounted a legislative, judicial,
and public relations attack on the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule. The Administration earnestly seeks implementation of a
"good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule which, if adopted,
would make criminal evidence apparently illegally seized in viola-
tion of the fourth amendment admissible into evidence in a criminal
trial if the seizing officer was acting in a good faith belief he was
following the law and his violation was merely a technical one.
On the legislative front, the Administration proposes a new sec-
tion to the federal criminal code which adopts a subjective good
faith exception. I
On the judicial front, the Administration, buoyed by its success
in the former Fifth Circuit en bane decision in United States v. Wil-
liams,' is now seeking to establish good faith exception beachheads
on the exclusionary rule at every turn in the courts. It participated
as amicus curiae both in briefs and oral argument in the abortive
* Mr. Hall is a sole practitioner in Little Rock, Arkansas. He is the author of SEARCH
AND SEIZURE published in 1982 by Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Co. He is a Fellow in
the American Board of Criminal Lawyers and is certified as a Criminal Trial Advocate by
the National Board of Trial Advocacy.
1. Proposed 18 U.S.C. § 3505 is quoted in the text following note 64, infra.
2. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127.
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good faith exception case of the 1982 Term, Illinois v. Gates,3 where
the Supreme Court wisely realized that, factually and legally, Gates
was not the case to decide whether a blanket good faith exception
should be adopted.4
Now, the Administration has moved to the public relations
front to promote the good faith exception with Attorney General
William French Smith as its chief spokesman.5 The Attorney Gen-
eral has spoken on this on nationwide television, and he has been
making speeches around the country decrying the alleged societal
evils of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. In an effort to per-
suade lawyers, his speech has now begun appearing in bar journals
under the title "The Exclusionary Rule 'BE DAMNED.'"6
It is not legal argument. It is, rather, the latest chapter of the
running debate on the Politics of Crime, circa 1980's. The Attorney
General goes to great lengths to accuse the fourth amendment ex-
clusionary rule of contributing to the imbalance between the lawless
and the rights of society. He concludes by touting the Reagan Ad-
ministration's proposed legislation to create a "good faith excep-
tion" to the exclusionary rule where good faith technical violations
of the fourth amendment do not require evidentiary exclusion. As is
typical of this Administration, Attorney General Smith, its chief law
enforcement officer, makes sweeping generalizations about the ex-
clusionary rule and the good faith exception with simple solutions to
the so-called "problems." In generalizing, however, he makes some
glaring legal errors and unsupported factual assumptions about the
exclusionary rule and the good faith exception and even the practi-
cal necessity of a broad good faith exception under existing law.
I read the Attorney General's remarks in my own bar journal,
and I was concerned that the nation's chief law enforcement officer
could make such legally specious comments with impunity. I feel
constrained to respond and enter the fray. After considering differ-
3. 103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983). In inexplicably ordering reargument, the Supreme Court
directed the parties to brief the issue of whether the "good faith exception" should be
adopted. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S.Ct. 436 (1982).
4. 103 S.Ct. at 2321.
The Court has, however, recently granted certiorari in four good faith cases: Michigan
v. Clifford, 32 Cr.L. 4169 (No. 82-357, Jan. 24, 1983); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 33 Cr.L.
4093 (No. 82-963, June 27, 1983); Colorado v. Quintero, 33 Cr.L. 4094 (No. 82-1711, June
27, 1983); United States v. Leon, 33 Cr.L. 4094 (No. 82-1771, June 27, 1983).
5. FBI Director William Webster also has publicly appeared as a spokesman with At-
torney General Smith.
6. Smith, The Exclusionary Rule "BE DAMNED", 17 Ark. Law. 112 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Smith].
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ent avenues to pursue this response, I settled on a point-by-point
rebuttal which I believe makes the Attorney General's position con-
stitutionally suspect at best and legally fortifies the exclusionary rule
as a part of our constitutional jurisprudence.
A summary of the Administration's position
In his speech, Attorney General Smith first states that the pub-
lic believes the courts are not doing their part to curb the growth of
crime. He adds that our historic concern for the rights of the ac-
cused have "overwhelm[ed] the even more historic first principle of
government: Providing for the defense of society."7 Further, he
notes that "[m]ore and more Americans recognize that an imbalance
has arisen in the struggle between law and the lawless,"8 and one
weight in that imbalance is the exclusionary rule.
He notes that, historically, the exclusionary rule is a "judicially
created rule of law" not even mentioned in the fourth amendment to
the United States Constitution or anywhere else in the Constitution,
the Bill of Rights, or the federal criminal code. Since it was recog-
nized by the Supreme Court in 1914 in Weeks v. United States,9 the
rule has been criticized. The Attorney General does not mention
that Weeks recognized the exclusionary rule as a personal right.'l
He says that the states were not fully convinced of the value of the
exclusionary rule because, by the time the Court first decided that
the fourth amendment was not incorporated into the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment," only sixteen states had
adopted the exclusionary rule while thirty-one had refused to adopt
it.' 2 The Supreme Court finally made the exclusionary rule binding
on the states in Mapp v. Ohio '" in 1961. He says that the effect of the
exclusionary rule is that, quoting Justice Cardozo when Cardozo
was a judge on the New York Court of Appeals, "The criminal is to
7. Id. at 112.
8. Id.
9. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The exclusionary rule actually was first applied in the state
courts in State v. Slamon, 50 A. 1097 (Vt. 1901), and State v. Sheridan, 96 N.W. 730 (Iowa
1903).
10. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. at 392-94, 398. See infra notes 55-60 and accom-
panying text.
11. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), (overruled in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961)).
12. 338 U.S. at 33-39.
13. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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go free because the constable has blundered."' 4 No matter how
technical a violation of the fourth amendment, the evidence is sup-
pressed. "There is no weighing by the court of the seriousness of the
crime or the significance of the evidence. Even a good faith attempt
by a law enforcement officer to ensure the legality of the search will
not-if a technical flaw is uncovered-save the evidence of crime."'
5
The Attorney General pays lip service to two of the arguments
in favor of the exclusionary rule: deterrence of unlawful police con-
duct and the preservation of judicial integrity. No mention is made
of the personal right rationale of the exclusionary rule. He flatly
states that the deterrence rationale has no "empirical evidence" to
support it. The judicial integrity rationale is turned inside out by his
statement that there is no judicial integrity when the guilty go free.
In support of his position, the Attorney General states that
"[t]he rule is invoked upon the most technical of violations-even
when the officer could not reasonably have been expected to do
otherwise."' 6 In support of this proposition, he cites, with some jus-
tification, the bizarre judicial circumlocution of Robbins v. Calfor-
nia 17 and New York v. Belton 8 in 1981. The Supreme Court held
on somewhat similar probable cause facts that the trunk search in
Robbins should be supressed while the search incident of the pas-
senger compartment in Belton should be sustained. Then in 1982
the Court overruled Robbins in United States v. Ross,I9 holding that
probable cause to search a vehicle extends throughout the vehicle
wherever the probable cause might take the officer.
The Attorney General recognizes the 1979 report of the Gen-
eral Accounting Office of the U.S. Congress 20 which found that the
exclusionary rule was judicially invoked in only 1.3% of federal
criminal cases and figured in the declining of prosecution in only
0.4% of federal criminal cases. He says, however, that these figures
are misleading because the percentages are higher in some larger
districts unstudied by GAO. Also, he says the prosecutorial and ju-
dicial (trial and appellate) workload is unnecessarily high because
of fourth amendment issues. In addition, he finds an effective civil
14. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, -, 150 N.E. 585, 587, cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657
(1926) (denying suppression of the evidence).
15. Smith, supra note 6, at 113.
16. Id.
17. 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (overruled in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)).
18. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
19. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
20. Smith, supra note 6, at 114.
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remedy under the civil rights acts2 1 as a result of the broadening of
this civil remedy by the Supreme Court.
22
Finally, he says that the Administration has a remedy for the
"absurd consequence [of the exclusionary rule] of releasing the
guilty" 23-its proposed good faith exception legislation 24 which is
already the law in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits as a result of
United States v. Williams .25 This proposal, he says, when added to
other unidentified Administration proposals, "would . . . greatly
strengthen the ability of government to protect the law abiding-
without impairing our Constitutional liberties.
26
*hat is the fourth amendment?
The fourth amendment states as follows: "The right of the peo-
ple to be secure ip their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized."
27
The history of the fourth amendment shows that the first clause
provides a general protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures and the second clause dictates the requirements of search
warrants. 8
The quantity and complexity of fourth amendment litigation
has become mind boggling. Nowhere in the law have so few words
generated so much litigation and confusion. After more than twenty
years of intense litigation, since Mapp v. Ohio 29 made the exclusion-
ary rule binding on the states, much of the body of fourth amend-
ment law is now settled. While there are still several areas of the
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
22. In support of his statement, the Attorney General cites Monell v. New York City
Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See also Owen v. City of Independence, 445
U.S. 622 (1980).
23. Smith, supra note 6, at 115.
24. Quoted in the text following note 64, infra.
25. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1127 (1981).
26. Smith, supra note 6, at 115.
27. The Attorney General makes a Freudian slip in his speech-he omits the probable
cause and warrant clause when he quotes the Fourth Amendment. Smith, supra note 6, at
112. The significance of this omission will be apparent below in understanding the Adminis-
tration's proposed "good faith exception" which could very well be unconstitutional.
28. K. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, at 102-03 (1937).
29. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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law of search and seizure uncharted by the Supreme Court, the set-
tled principles of search and seizure law have made the Supreme
Court's decisions over the last several years somewhat predictable,
at least to fourth amendment lawyers.
"hy do we have a prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures?
The history of the fourth amendment is fascinating. It is rooted
in free speech, taxation, smuggling, corruption, litigation, and
politics.
30
In England, the power to search developed soon after the in-
vention of the printing press made it possible for malcontents to
subject the Crown to widespread criticism. General warrants and
writs of assistance were issued by the Crown to almost anyone (not
necessarily police officers) to search private property to seize alleg-
edly libelous and seditious publications. The infamous Star Cham-
ber issued and enforced general warrants. Somewhat later, the
power of search and seizure was used to enforce the tax laws and
collect import duties.
The general warrant and writ of assistance came to the colonies
to restrict American foreign trade. It turned out, however, that they
were used more vigorously here than in England.
The general warrant first succumbed to a judicial attack in
England in 1765 in Entick v. Carrington3 which held invalid a gen-
eral search warrant to seize papers. Meanwhile, the various states
adopted their own protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures just before and after the Declaration of Independence. The
Constitutional Convention omitted a Bill of Rights, but there was an
understanding that one would be shortly referred to the states. This
contributed to the delay in adoption of the Constitution. The Bill of
Rights was finally sent to the states and adopted in 1792.
The Attorney General seems to attribute the Bill of Rights to
30. This brief account of the history of the Fourth Amendment is summarized from J.
HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §§ 1:11-1:15 (1982), which summarized the two significant
works on the history of the Fourth Amendment: K. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOP-
MENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, ch. 1-3
(1937) and J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT ch. 1 (1966).
See also Marcus v. Search Warrant of Property, 367 U.S. 717, 724-29 (1961); Kamisar, Does
(Did) (Should) The Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather Than An "Empiri-
cal Proposition "'?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 571-79 (1983).
I apologize to the reader for occasionally citing myself-it is easier to do so than restate
propositions and recite many other authorities.
31. 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
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"our historical concern for the rights of the accused" and that "we
have needlessly allowed [this concern] to overwhelm the even more
historic first principle of government: Providing for the defense of
society."32 The fourth amendment, however, was intended to pro-
tect all citizens, both the law-abiding and the lawless, from govern-
mental intrusions.33 After all, it does refer to "The right of the
people to be secure . . ."; not just the criminal element. Indeed, the
entire body of the law of administrative searches and inspections
developed from a need to enforce civil law rather than the criminal
law.
The Attorney General cannot so easily dismiss our right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures as a mere protection
for the criminal accused. The fourth amendment protects all of us.
The exclusionary rule as a remedy for a fourth amendment violation
The Attorney General observes that "[tihe exclusionary rule is
a judicially created rule of law" that is "not to be found anywhere in
the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, or the federal criminal code. It
was also not inherited from English law."
'34
True. But the entire common law and the law of equity is
based on judicially created remedies. The exclusionary rule had not
been found necessary by the time the fourth amendment was rati-
fied because an after-the-fact remedy was not yet required.35 How
else do we enforce fundamental constitutional rights in our present
system of justice so the fourth amendment will not become a mere
"form of words"? 36 After all, it is no longer the Eighteenth Century.
The Weeks court made this absolutely clear nearly seventy years
ago:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held
and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the
protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be
secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so
far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken
32. Smith, supra note 6, at 112.
33. See, e.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S.
301, 313 (1958); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948); United States v.
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932); Go-Ban Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344,
357 (1931); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925); Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
34. Smith, supra note 6, at 112.
35. Kamisar, supra note 30, at 571-79.
36. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 655.
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from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials
to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are
not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles estab-
lished by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in
their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land. . . . In
Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, this court said that the Fourth
Amendment was intended to secure the citizen in person and
property against unlawful invasion of the sanctity of his home by
officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction.
This protection is equally extended to the action of the Govern-
ment and officers of the law acting under it. Boyd Case, 116 U.S.
616. To sanction such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial
decision a manifest neglect if not an open defiance of the prohibi-
tions of the Constitution, intended for the protection of the peo-
ple against such unauthorized action.37
As I read Blackstone, I submit that he would have approved of the
exclusionary rule had it been thought of in his time.38
Many alternatives to the exclusionary rule have been proposed
in the last twenty years, the most notable and influential being in
Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.39 Bivens held that there
was a federal cause of action against federal officers for fourth
amendment violations. Chief Justice Burger used Bivens as a forum
to restate his longstanding views' that the exclusionary rule should
be reformulated or replaced outright.4 ' He generally stated five al-
ternatives: (a) waiver of sovereign immunity for search and seizure
torts; (b) creation of a cause of action for search and seizure torts;
(c) creation of a tribunal to hear search and seizure tort claims; (d) a
statutory remedy in lieu of evidentiary exclusion; and (e) general
37. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393-94.
38. See I BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *244-45:
For, as to such public oppressions as tend to dissolve the constitution, and
subvert the fundamentals of government, they are cases, which the law will not, out
of decency suppose: being incapable of distrusting those, whom it has invested
with any part of the supreme power; since such distrust would render the exercise
of that power precarious and impracticable. For, wherever the law expresses its
distrust of abuse of power, it always vests a superior coercive authority in some
other hand to correct it; the very notion of which destroys the idea of sovereignty.
For which reason all oppressions which may happen to spring from any branch of
the sovereign power, must necessarily be out of the reach of any stated rule, or
express legal provision: but, if ever they unfortunately happen, the prudence of the
times must provide new remedies upon new emergencies. [emphasis in original].
39. 403 U.S. 388, 413 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
40. See Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM. U. L. REV. I (1964).
41. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 413-19 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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provisions prohibiting the exclusion of evidence.4" He also spoke
approvingly of the then proposed ALT Model Code of Pre-arraign-
ment Procedure "Substantiality Test. '4 3 The ALI Substantiality
Test is a form of the good faith exception which requires that the
violation of the right against unreasonable searches be "substantial
[i.e., "gross, willful, and prejudicial to the accused"] or . . .other-
wise required by the Constitution . . . ."' Nevertheless, Chief Jus-
tice Burger did concede "the need for some remedy to give meaning
and teeth to the constitutional guarantees against unlawful conduct
by government officials."45
The exclusionary rule does not always free the guilty
The Attorney General states almost as fact that the guilty go
free when evidence is excluded because the exclusionary rule is in-
voked. This is not always so.
Evidence illegally seized is, of course, powerful evidence of
guilt. Its evidentiary reliability is usually unquestioned. When ille-
gally seized evidence is excluded, the case proceeds from there. In
possessory offenses, such as drug, gambling, and weapons cases,
suppression of the evidence could very well result in a dismissal of
charges. In other types of cases, however, the result of the criminal
case could very well be unchanged. Take, for example, Coolidge v.
New Hampshire,"6 mentioned by the Attorney General for another
proposition in his speech. Coolidge involved probably the most hei-
nous murder in New Hampshire's history. After Coolidge's convic-
tion, evidence seized from his house and car was suppressed by the
Supreme Court as a result of illegal searches, and his conviction was
reversed. On retrial, Coolidge was convicted without the illegally
seized evidence. Consider also Mincey v. Arizona47 which involved
the killing of a police officer during a drug raid. Notwithstanding
eyewitnesses to the occurrence, the police felt compelled to subject
the defendant's house to an intensive four-day search, and the evi-
dence so obtained was used against him. The Court suppressed the
42. Id. at 422-23.
43. Id. at 419. See ALl MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § SS 290.2
(Official Draft 1975).
44. ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § SS 290.2(3) (Official Draft
1975).
45. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 415.
46. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
47. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
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search, and Mincey stood trial again and was convicted.4"
The Attorney General makes note of the General Accounting
Office report that the exclusionary rule was actually invoked in only
1.3% of filed federal criminal cases and that only 0.4% of declined
cases were declined for prosecution because of fourth amendment
problems. He finds this "exceedingly weak support for the exclu-
sionary rule's continuation. ' 49 He further counters this statistic by
challenging its true effect because 33% of all defendants going to
trial file suppression motions (accounting for 55% of all motions
filed) which waste the time of courts and prosecutors and because
suppression motions are made in 20% of all cases in some larger
districts. He also notes that a 1971 state court study in three
branches of the Chicago Circuit Court reported that fourth amend-
ment suppression motions in onlypossessory offenses were successful
30% of the time.
The most common failures of the police to comply with the re-
quirements of the fourth amendment are in possessory offenses. It is
here that the exclusionary rule has its greatest impact because the
entire case may very well turn on the legality of a search and seizure
or an arrest or both.
But, Mr. Attorney General, let's not ignore the fact that a large
number of street encounters result in illegal searches and arrests
where there is no pretext of a successful prosecution. The police
succeed in removing a small quantity of drugs or a gun from circu-
lation. And who is there to complain; the dope dealer illegally
stripped of his cache of drugs? Hardly. Only when the police get
serious and decide to prosecute do they usually have to justify their
conduct.
Finally, it should not be lost on anyone what the Attorney Gen-
eral's figures really mean: In urban areas the police are more likely
to have violated the fourth amendment, and he is tacitly admitting
that the police are not going to comply with the fourth amendment
in a substantial number of cases. The fact that some classes of peo-
ple are more likely to be subjected to an illegal search and many
police will invariably violate civil liberties should be a compelling
reason to retain the exclusionary rule, not discard it. The Attorney
General's argument just does not follow.
48. See State v. Mincey, 130 Ariz. 389, 636 P.2d 637 (1981), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 1638
(1982).
49. Smith, supra note 6, at 114.
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Judicial economy is no ground to modify the exclusionary rule
The Goddess of Justice is not a Cost Accountant. The criminal
courts exist to resolve disputes between government and its citizens
over whether criminal laws were violated and whether the Constitu-
tion was violated in getting the defendant before the bar of the
court. The fact that the Administration seriously argues that the
courts have better things to do than determine whether the govern-
ment has violated the rights of its citizens is incredible.
The deterrence rationale is not a failure
The Supreme Court now considers whether the police will be
deterred from fourth amendment violations in determining whether
to order exclusion in a particular case. In United States v. Calan-
dra,50 Justice Powell wrote for six members of the Court:
The purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to redress the
injury to the privacy of the search victim:
'[T]he ruptured privacy of the victims' homes and effects
cannot be restored. Reparation comes too late.' Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965). Instead, the rule's prime pur-
pose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effec-
tuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against
unreasonable searches and seizures:
'The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose
is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in
the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to
disregard it.' Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
In sum, the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deter-
rent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party
aggrieved.
Despite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclusionary rule
has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized
evidence in all proceedings or against all persons. As with any
remedial device, the application of the rule has been restricted to
those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most effica-
ciously served. The balancing process implicit in this approach is
expressed in the contours of the standing requirement. 5'
There is a justifiable belief that the deterrence rationale was not
even considered when the exclusionary rule was fashioned in
50. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
51. Id. at 347-48 (footnote omitted).
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Weeks .52
Without even getting into the argument over the true purpose
of the exclusionary rule,53 one cannot logically say that the exclu-
sionary rule does not ever deter unlawful police conduct. A profes-
sional police officer strives to make sound cases in order to make
convictions. If he has too many invalid arrests or searches, his per-
sonnel record will show it and promotions may not follow. If he
develops a reputation as a liar or one who "plays fast and loose"
with the fourth amendment, judges will not believe him at suppres-
sion hearings or even at court trials on the merits of a criminal case.
If he is more concerned with clearing outstanding cases by arrest
and has no concern whether he convicts anyone, then the deterrence
rationale simply will not be effective as to him. And, what if he
simply chooses not to be deterred at all?
I, for one, refuse to believe that professional law enforcement
officers as a group are so devious or stupid that the deterrence ra-
tionale cannot have an effect on the way they do their job. It is
human nature to succeed in one's profession and do well.
But some want to do well at the expense of others. They meas-
ure success by arrests and not convictions. They blame the courts
for being lenient when their constitutional errors must be accounted
for. Those of us in the search and seizure bar have all encountered
law enforcement officers who will go to any length to make a case
against someone who they believe deserves to be convicted. Even
the threat of a perjury conviction does not deter them. Obviously,
the exclusionary rule does not deter these officers either. How, then,
Mr. Attorney General, do you propose to protect the citizenry from
the criminal hiding behind a badge who is not to be deterred by
anything? The only protection is evidentiary exclusion.
It has been said that the empirical data on the administration of
the exclusionary rule does not support the conclusion that the rule
deters unlawful police conduct.5 4 Ideally, the fourth amendment it-
self should deter fourth amendment violations, but it doesn't, and
the courts have done a lot to promote fourth amendment violations
by not taking suppression motions seriously. The fourth amend-
ment is violated every day in every major jurisdiction. What other
52. Id. at 356-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
53. See infra text accompanying notes 55 to 60.
54. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665,
666 (1970). But see generally Kamisar, supra note 30.
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remedy except the exclusionary rule is effective to limit police con-
duct before it occurs? I don't see one yet.
What about the personal right rationale?
Weeks considered the exclusion of evidence due to a fourth
amendment violation to be a matter of personal right.55 While the
present Supreme Court has ignored this rationale for exclusion in
favor of the deterrence rationale,56 it has been forcefully argued by
some influential commentators that Weeks' original understanding
still has currency and constitutional validity.57 These commentators
find the Weeks' personal right theory as "simply another name for
judicial review" of executive action 8 under Marbury v. Madison .9
The personal right rationale eliminates the need to consider the
sometimes imponderable question of whether invoking the rule in a
particular case would serve to deter the police from future violations
of the fourth amendment.
The time is ripe for a reemergence of the personal right ration-
ale. Indeed, on June 29 the Oregon Supreme Court applied the per-
sonal right theory in excluding evidence.6 °
A civil remedy is ineffective
The Attorney General urges aggrieved criminal defendants to
instead pursue the allegedly expanded civil remedies provided for
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).61 It is folly to think that a potential
civil action by a defendant convicted on illegally obtained evidence
has any deterrent or remedial value at all. As the Attorney General
must recognize, the brunt of the civil action will fall on the govern-
mental entity employing the officer, not the officer himself, both in
the costs of defense and in paying judgments. Also, the increased
use of insurance shifts the cost away from the officer and his em-
ployer. Finally, and by no means lastly, it has not been lost on the
police that a person they can label "criminal" in a civil trial makes a
miserably poor plaintiff. Anyone who has tried a § 1983 illegal
55. See supra text accompanying note 37.
56. See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 338 (1974).
57. Schrock & Welsh, Up From Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional
Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REV. 251 (1974); see also Kamisar, supra note 30.
58. Shrock & Welsch, supra note 47, at 324-26, 335-66; see also Kamisar, supra note 30,
at 590-97.
59. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
60. State v. Davis, Ore.S.Ct. (No. 28881, June 29, 1983) (NLJ, 7-18-83).
61. See cases cited supra note 22.
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search action where evidence of the crime was found can vouch for
that. The police attitude to civil actions can best be summed up in
an exchange I had with a police officer 62: "If you don't like it, sue
me. You can't get somethin' for nothin'." To this I replied, "Be-
sides, you're insured, right?" He just smiled.
So, Mr. Attorney General, how does a civil action provide any
deterrence or any effective remedy?
The Administration's proposed goodfaith exception
The Attorney General proposes in his speech that the exclu-
sionary rule be eliminated 63 in favor of a good faith exception which
would allow the admission of evidence whenever an officer conducts
a search with a warrant or, in the case of warrantless searches, with
a reasonable good faith belief he was acting in accordance with the
fourth amendment.
The good faith exception is almost unworkable in its practical
application, and it has some serious constitutional problems if not
properly administered. As a practical matter, these problems must
be resolved on a case-by-case basis before a broad good faith excep-
tion can be adopted by statute or judicial decision.
The good faith exception takes two forms: subjective good
faith and objective good faith. One cannot tell exactly which one
the Attorney General espouses. What has been said publicly does
not always square with the language of the proposal. At times, the
Administration confuses the two, and the distinction is crucial as to
how the exception will be administered and applied.
The Administration's proposal is said to adopt the result in
United States v. Williams.' Williams is clear as to its holding, but
the Administration's proposal is as inscrutable as the fourth amend-
ment itself. Proposed 18 U.S.C. § 3505 provides:
Except as specifically provided by statute, evidence which is
obtained as a result of a search or seizure and which is otherwise
admissible shall not be excluded in a proceeding in a court of the
United States if the search or seizure was undertaken in a reason-
able, good faith belief that it was in conformity with the fourth
amendment to the Constitution of the United States. A showing
62. This was during the course of a search and seizure of a client's business property,
and I suggested that a later, more convenient production of the items sought would not
leave the obvious appearance that the officers were trying to harm the client's business.
63. Sometimes he says "modified."
64. See infra text accompanying note 82.
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that evidence was obtained pursuant to and within the scope of a
warrant constitutes prima facie evidence of such a reasonable
good faith belief, unless the warrant was obtained through inten-
tional and material misrepresentation.
What is a "reasonable, good faith belief"? Reasonable by what
standard and according to whom? How will the good faith excep-
tion be administered? Is it constitutional?
The good faith exception is unworkable
Professor LaFave has identified four adverse consequences
which will result from the good faith exception applicable to the
Administration's proposal.65
First, the good faith exception, to paraphrase Justice Brennan,
could stop development of fourth amendment doctrine dead in its
tracks because, without clear precedent, no officer would not be act-
ing in good faith.66
Second, the suppression judge will have to "probe the subjec-
tive knowledge" of the searching officers. 67 That is nearly impossi-
ble. Also, the government's case will be the officer's "self-serving
and generally uncontradicted testimony.
'" 68
I would add a further comment: the good faith exception is an
open invitation to police perjury. To a good many police officers,
the end justifies the means in this "often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime. ' 69 They could fabricate their good faith belief
in fact or law from whole cloth, and no one could contradict it. Af-
ter all, isn't a little perjury preferable to letting a criminal loose on
the streets, especially if you can't get caught at it?7°
Third, adoption of the good faith exception "would likely result
in a distinct pro-police (or, if you prefer, anti-fourth amendment)
65. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing "Bright Lines"
and "Good Faith", 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307, 354-59 (1982). This article contains an excellent
discussion of the good faith exception. Id. at 333-59.
66. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 554 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 553.
68. Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1045 (1974).
69. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
70. Then who is the bigger criminal? In PRINCE OF THE CITY, a story about police
corruption in a special narcotics investigation unit, the U.S. Attorney's Office is questioning
Det. Ralph Alvarez about whether or not he ever perjured himself to secure a drug convic-
tion. Alvarez said, "Yeah. I've committed perjury about twenty times. You guys don't




bias in suppression rulings."'I "'[W]hat it means in practice is that
appellate courts defer to the trial courts and trial courts defer to the
police.' "72
Fourth, application of the good faith exception legalizes the
challenged conduct in the future.73 The police will also then " 'push
to the limit' any authority they are given by the courts.
74
Litigating the officer's subjective state of mind is nearly impos-
sible. The Supreme Court rejected that very argument in declining
to adopt target standing in Rakas v. Illinois75 because of the "admin-
istrative burdens" in determining who the officer considered a
"target.
76
Can you imagine how far afield a suppression hearing could go
if the officer's state of mind would suddenly be relevant? Would the
officer's overall suppression and conviction record then become rel-
evant to his claim that he acted in good faith when he violated the
fourth amendment? (How about the magistrate's record or the of-
ficer's knowledge that the magistrate has a bad record in fourth
amendment cases?) The one hour suppression hearing may become
an all day affair. In 1982 in State v. z"ti'e, 77 the Washington
Supreme Court found the good faith exception unworkable because
of this subjectivity problem which imposed an unnecessary and un-
workable burden on the courts.78
71. LaFave, supra note 65, at 357.
72. Id. (quoting Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 394 (1974)).
Generally, factual determinations of the suppression judge are not reversed unless
clearly erroneous. If there is a conflict in the facts, the judge's findings are seldom
overturned.
73. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968). See also infra note 91.
74. LaFave, supra note 65, at 359 n.285 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160, 182 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
75. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
76. Id. at 136-37. See J. HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §§ 23:5, at 654 n.6 (1982) &
23:3.1, at 287 (1983 Supp)., suggesting that Rakas must effectively be overruled if the
Supreme Court chooses to adopt the good faith exception.
77. 97 Wash. 2d 92, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982). See also Jennings v. City and County of San
Francisco Superior Court, 104 Cal. App. 3d 50, 163 Cal. Rptr. 391, 395-96 (1980) (good faith
exception rejected as contrary to judicial integrity); Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 387 Mass.
488, 441 N.E.2d 725 (1982), cert. grantedsub nom. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 51 U.S.L.W.
3913 (U.S. June 28, 1983) (No. 82-963) (good faith exception rejected as to magistrate's error
even though police conduct proper).
78. See State v. White, 640 P.2d at 1069 n.6:
The officer's 'good faith' in Michigan v. DeFillippo, supra, required a showing
only that he enforced a presumptively valid statute in the good faith belief it was
valid. The incorporation of a subjective good faith test is unworkable in situations
not directly addressed by Chief Justice Burger's opinion. For example, what if, as
242 [Vol. 6:227
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Some of the proposed good faith exception statutes require a
finding of good faith if the magistrate issued a warrant. What about
the subjective good faith of the magistrate? What if the magistrate
is not "neutral and detached," but is a mere "rubber-stamp" for the
police? Can any lazy or incompetent judge turn a bad search into a
good one by giving it his or her blessing?7 9 Can a judge make a
good search bad by issuing a defective warrant?8" (Warrants are
usually written and provided by the police. Surely the courts and
legislatures know that.)
The goodfaith exception is undefinable
In its broad sense, the good faith exception is undefinable. For
any form of good faith exception to be recognized and reasonably
administered, it must be developed on a case-by-case basis. If there
will be no deterrence in a particular situation, we can analyze it and
see how and why. To adopt a good faith exception by shotgunning
the exclusionary rule, we have no way of knowing whether deter-
rence is involved in any particular type of situation until it arises
and the officer testifies about the occurrence.8 '
An objective good faith exception developed realistically on a
case-by-case basis has some limited appeal. Then, it would concep-
tually make sense. The former Fifth Circuit's objective good faith
formulation in United States v. Williams requires that the officer's
good faith conduct "must be grounded in an objective reasonable-
ness" and "must therefore be based upon articulable premises suffi-
here, a similar statute was invalidated 10 years previously? How about I month
before the arrest? What if fellow officers know of contrary case law, but the arrest-
ing officer does not? How do courts probe the minds of officers to see if their
beliefs of validity are truly held? Can a criminal defendant ever successfully refute
the officer's assertions of good faith? See Amsterdam, Perspective on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 436-37 (1974). The good faith standard im-
poses yet another factual burden on the courts in the already complex Fourth
Amendment area. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 560-61 (1975) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). We believe the objective probable cause standard is the only
workable test in cases such as the one before us.
79. See the last sentence of proposed 18 U.S.C. § 3505: "A showing that evidence was
obtained pursuant to and within the scope of a warrant constitutes prima facie evidence of
such a reasonable good faith belief, unless the warrant was obtained through intentional and
material misrepresentation."
80. Compare Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, 441 N.E.2d 725 (1982), cert.
granted sub nom. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 51 U.S.L.W. 3913 (U.S. June 28, 1983) (No.
82-963), where the Massachusetts court refused to apply the good faith exception to a magis-
trate's fourth amendment error in the warrant where the police acted properly.
8 1. To legislate in advance that the officer is not deterred pretty well answers the ques-
tion for us, doesn't it?
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cient to cause a reasonable, and reasonably trained, officer to believe
that he was acting lawfully."82 This may be narrow enough to sat-
isfy the deterrence rationale. 3 The Administration's proposal ig-
nores this important requirement. Under its proposal the officer's
own belief (and, hence, his state of mind) is determinative. LaFave
notes, however, that existing fourth amendment doctrine already
sufficiently deals with that issue." So what possible purpose would
the Administration's proposal really serve?
A broad goodfaith exception is unnecessary
I submit that a good faith exception statute is unnecessary. The
Supreme Court already recognizes the good faith exception on a
case-by-case basis where good faith is evident, and the deterrence
rationale would not be served by suppression of the evidence. 5
Why, then, is it necessary to pass a statute with innumerable poten-
tial administrative problems? Additionally, Williams even dodged
the crucial question of which side carries the burden of proof on
demonstrating good faith or lack of good faith.86
Conclusion
Our system of justice depends upon the rule of law and the
premise that government should follow the law when enforcing it.
The fourth amendment cannot be so hollow a constitutional guaran-
tee that it is relegated to being an ineffective tort remedy when gov-
ernment agents choose to violate the law in the name of law and
order.
The Attorney General's claim that our constitutional liberties
will not be impaired if the exclusionary rule is done away with
82. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d at 841 n.4a (5th Cir. 1980).
83. See LaFave, supra note 65, at 347-48.
84. Id. at 348, 348-354.
85. See, e.g., Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979) (search incident to arrest
under presumptively valid ordinance would not be suppressed even where ordinance was
later declared invalid); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975) (fourth amendment
retroactivity case; search would not be suppressed where officers relied on consistent body of
decisional law and administrative regulation later overturned); Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U.S. 433 (1974) (fifth amendment case; confession not excluded where officers violated Mi-
randa in good faith).
86. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d at 846-47. Under existing law, however, the
burden would seem to be with the prosecution in a warrantless search and with the defense
in a search under a warrant. See, e.g., Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978) (search
under warrant) and United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 174 (1974) (warrantless search).
How the defense will be able to carry the burden when the officer's state of mind is an issue
is hard to imagine. See supra text following note 76.
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under the Administration's proposal just does not square with logic
or any form of common understanding.
In a related vein concerning the ongoing debate on the sixth
amendment good faith "Christian burial speech" case,87 Circuit
Judge Richard Sheppard Arnold of the Eighth Circuit wrote just
this year in Williams v. Nix88 :
It will inevitably be remarked that our opinion focuses more
on the conduct of the police than of the alleged murderer. If Wil-
liams is indeed guilty, and if he goes free as a result of our hold-
ing, then complete justice may not have been done, even though
Williams has served 14 years in prison. A system of law that not
only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for
the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its ap-
plication to individual cases, and will from time to time produce
imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the
particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the
necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place.
That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights.
This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth pay-
ing, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the
Constitution is strictly enforced.89
The police often treat the fourth amendment like it is "a mere
technicality" anyway. 90 If the courts start doing it too, the freedom
of all of us has been seriously weakened. Wholesale adoption of the
good faith exception will effectively grant the police the right to vio-
late the fourth amendment with relative impunity. 9' The last sev-
enty years under the exclusionary rule will be just so much history.
If the fourth amendment can no longer be relied on as a basic limi-
87. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
88. 700 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S.Ct. 2427 (1983).
89. Id., 700 F.2d at 1173.
90. See Justice Frankfurter's dissent in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69
(1950):
It is true also of journeys in the law that the place you reach depends on the
direction you are taking. And so, where one comes out on a case depends on where
one goes in. It makes all the difference in the world whether one approaches the
Fourth Amendment as the Court approached it in Boyd v. United States. . .. in
Weeks v. United States ... , in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States ... , in
Gouled v. United States ... , or one approaches it as a provision dealing with a
formality. It makes all the difference in the world whether one recognizes the cen-
tral fact about the Fourth Amendment, namely, that it was a safeguard against
recurrence of abuses so deeply felt by the Colonies as to be one of the potent causes
of the Revolution, or one thinks of it as merely a requirement for a piece of paper.
91. When the courts accept illegally seized evidence, they induce further such violations
of the fourth amendment. Amsterdam, supra note 61, at 432.
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tation on government to protect us from unreasonable governmental
intrusions, what will? I, for one, cannot imagine a society where
personal liberty is at the whim of the good faith (real, imagined, or
manufactured) of the police.92 There, none of us will be safe.
92. See L. HAND, SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 189-90 (3d ed. 1960):
I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much upon constitutions,
upon laws and upon courts. These are false hopes; believe me, these are false
hopes. Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no consti-
tution, no law, no court can save it; no constitution, no law, no court can even do
much to help it. While it lies there it needs no constitution, no law, no court to
save it.
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